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Keeping the Lid on Charter Schools: Capping and the Politics of Education Reform
In Connecticut

Lesley DeNardis
Sacred Heart University

Abstract
Charter schools, public schools that operate with greater autonomy than their
traditional counterparts, first opened in Minnesota in 1991. Between 1991 and 2010, they
spread to 40 states and the District of Columbia. In recent months, they have received
renewed policy attention under the Obama administration’s Race to the Top competitive
federal grant program which rewarded states for educational innovation including the
creation of charter schools. While experiencing impressive growth, charter schools lag
behind traditional public schools in size and in number, accounting for only 2.9% of the
total public school population nationwide. State factors that are predictive of a large
charter school supply such as high income, urbanization, population heterogeneity, and
an achievement gap, are present in Connecticut. Yet charter schools remain on the
margins of reform efforts since the Constitution state opened its first charter school in
1997. This paper will explain the political and institutional factors that account for
Connecticut’s low provision of charter schools as rooted in a weak charter school law.
By tracing the political history of charter schools in Connecticut, this paper will explore
the dynamic interplay between the legislative and executive branches as well as the role
of educational interest groups in accounting for Connecticut’s weak charter school law.
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Introduction
It has been nearly twenty years since the first charter school opened in Minnesota
in 1991. Once a fledgling reform movement, charter schools have spread nationwide to
40 states for a total number of 5,000 schools enrolling 1.5 million students (CER 2010).
With such growth it would appear that charter schools have earned a permanent place in
the American educational landscape. Yet, when considered in the context of the total
share of public schools, charter schools still lag behind their traditional counterparts in
size and number accounting for only 2.9% of the total public school population and 4.8%
of all public schools (CER 2010).
After a protracted legislative battle, the Constitution state passed a charter school
law in 1996. Today, there are twenty two charter schools in operation. In drawing
national comparisons, Connecticut falls below the national average with charter schools
accounting for approximately 1.6% of the total public school population. While
Connecticut possesses many of the characteristics that are associated with a large supply
of charter schools elsewhere such as high income levels, urbanization, and population
heterogeneity which have spurred policy experimentation in other states (Corcoran and
Stoddard 2007), charter schools remain on the margin of reform efforts. In attempting to
explain the below average supply of charter schools in states, scholars have examined
provisions of state charter laws that either facilitate or impede the growth of charter
schools. In the case of Connecticut, the roots of its weak charter school law can be traced
back to the political compromise struck during passage of the original legislation and
subsequent modifications of the law that have curtailed the growth of charter schools.
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Table 1: National Charter School and Enrollment Statistics
Operating in 2009Opening in 2010Total Estimated
State
2010
2011
Total Operating
Enrollment
Alaska
28
2
30
6,169
Arizona
564
17
581
142,848
Arkansas
28
4
32
10,099
California
827
114
941
348,686
Colorado
161
15
176
66,186
Connecticut
21
1
22
4,992
Delaware
19
1
20
9,581
DC
96
5
101
29,557
Florida
427
56
483
150,199
Georgia
92
17
109
57,987
Hawaii
32
0
32
7,668
Idaho
34
5
39
14,951
Illinois
83
16
99
37,860
Indiana
54
8
62
19,669
Iowa
9
0
9
1,413
Kansas
37
0
37
5,003
Louisiana
82
14
96
33,083
Maryland
37
3
40
9,792
Massachusetts
64
2
66
25,167
Michigan
286
13
299
111,397
Minnesota
161
0
161
30,184
Mississippi
0
0
0
0
Missouri
40
6
46
17,684
Nevada
27
0
27
8,033
New Hampshire
11
0
11
2,162
New Jersey
71
7
78
20,626
New Mexico
73
9
82
14,932
New York
153
33
186
47,364
North Carolina
101
3
104
36,577
Ohio
334
34
368
114,554
Oklahoma
17
0
17
5,970
Oregon
98
11
109
17,261
Pennsylvania
147
8
155
85,142
Rhode Island
13
3
16
3,402
South Carolina
37
8
45
12,627
Tennessee
20
8
28
4,963
Texas
402
20
422
139,665
Utah
77
6
83
35,019
Virginia
3
1
4
341
Wisconsin
218
15
233
40,645
Wyoming
4
0
4
505
TOTAL
4,988
465
5,453
1,729,963
* The number of schools opening and enrollment in 2010 are estimates. The number of schools includes
campuses.
Source: The Center for Education Reform, October 2010
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This paper will highlight the political and institutional factors that have impeded
the growth of charter schools in Connecticut. The first section provides an overview of
the charter school phenomenon nationwide with a brief history of the origins of the
movement. The study will then trace the legislative history of charter schools in
Connecticut from the early 1990s to passage of the first charter school law in 1996 and
concludes with a discussion of the latest education reform act passed by the Connecticut
General Assembly in 2010. Finally, some tentative predictions will be offered regarding
the future of charter schools in Connecticut in light of the legal and regulatory framework
within which they currently operate.
The Emergence of Charter Schools in the United States
With the publication of A Nation at Risk (NCEE 1983), a general consensus
emerged that public schools were failing. Drawing comparisons from international test
score data that showed American students lagging behind other countries, the report
underscored the deficiencies of the public school system and created a climate in which
large scale reforms could be discussed with greater receptivity among policy makers. It
was in this context that charter schools emerged as one type of reform aimed at
improving student achievement. The concept arose out of the larger school choice debate
whose underlying premise, advanced by Milton Friedman (1955), was that the traditional
public school system operated much like a monopoly which deprived parents the freedom
to choose. The lack of competition meant students had few exit options other than to flee
failing public schools for private ones, a choice not readily available to all. Friedman
called for the introduction of competition into public schools to break the public school
monopoly. Competition would not only afford parents greater choice over their
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children’s education, it would produce what is referred to as “second order” effects or
systemic change. According to this logic, traditional public schools, when faced with
school competition in the form of vouchers and charter schools, would be forced to adopt
reforms or risk loosing students.
Friedman’s arguments have resonated in various quarters. Albert Shanker (1988),
the former President of the American Federation of Teachers, remarked that public
education operated much like a planned economy and that the time had come to empower
teachers by allowing them submit a proposal to set up autonomous public schools within
their school buildings. Ray Budde (1996), an Assistant Education Professor at University
of Massachusetts Amherst, later built upon this idea by coining the phrase “charter” to
describe a model that would allow teachers to be chartered directly by school boards for
3-5 years to implement specific instructional programs.
Charter schools were propelled forward from a novel policy idea to a concrete
reality by Ted Kolderie, a Minnesota legislator, who was instrumental in passing the
nation’s first charter school law. The charter school concept had evolved from Budde’s
version of chartering programs to chartering schools as completely autonomous entities
apart from traditional public schools. Kolderie (1990) developed several principles or
characteristics that would distinguish charter schools from their traditional public school
counterparts. These characteristics would serve as guiding principles for would-be
charter operators. Perhaps the most novel characteristic of charter schools is notion that
they may be organized by anyone. Teachers, parents, students and other interested
parties could serve as the driving force behind the creation of a charter school. Those
wishing to start a charter school would be able to approach more than one public body for
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their charter, preferably an entity other than the local school district which would
presumably block competition. The role of teachers would also be markedly different
from traditional public schools. In charter schools, teachers would be given opportunities
to participate in the design of schools and to devise instructional practices free from
government regulations which arguably stifle innovation.
The most notable feature of charter schools is their freedom from many district
and state regulations. In exchange for this increased autonomy, charter schools are held
accountable for student achievement through the school’s charter. A “charter” is a
statutorily defined performance contract detailing the school’s mission, program, goals,
and assessment. Usually granted for five years at a time, the charter can be revoked for
failure to perform up to specified standards, a feature which appeals to pro-market
advocates for its responsiveness to parents and students.
Since their inception in the 1990s, charter schools have gained adherents on both
sides of the political spectrum. This emerging consensus dovetailed with Chubb and
Moe’s seminal work on Politics, Markets and America’s Schools (1990) which served as
the intellectual groundwork for many of the ideas underlying charter schools. The
authors called for restructuring public education using market principles, choice, and
competition. The authors concluded that governance arrangements more than any other
factor have the greatest impact on educational outcomes and that excessive rules and
regulations were hampering student performance. Their vision of a radically changed
organizational and governance structure animated the charter school movement.
Capturing the essence of charter schools has been a difficult task for scholars and
policy advocates. They have been variously described as a hybrid organizational form, a
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middle ground (Witte, Schlomer and Schober 2007) or third way between public and
private schools and as a less radical alternative to vouchers. Henig (2002) captures this
sentiment well with the following: “Frustrated with the poor performance of public
schools, but unable to advance more radical notions of privatization such as vouchers,
advocates saw charter schools as the most effective means of building market
incentives.” This feature of charter schools as making inroads into choice in a modified
and less dramatic way than vouchers has been a common strategy during the legislative
process.
As a hybrid organizational structure, charter schools draw from elements of public
schools and private schools. They are reminiscent of private schools in their freedom
from state and local regulations by providing considerable latitude over matters of hiring,
curriculum and budget. However, charter schools still retain fundamental principles of
public education including their source of funding, open-enrollment policies and the fact
that they are nonsectarian and are nondiscriminatory in admissions policies (Hart and
Burr 1996).
Wherever they have emerged, charter schools have engendered intense political
battles for challenging the educational status quo (Vergari 2007). State legislatures have
been the main battleground where these debates have played out, most intensely during
the passage of charter school laws. Legislators, subject to myriad influences in
policymaking, have had to respond to cross-cutting pressures from pro-charter school
advocates and education interest groups. To understand more fully the degree to which
charter legislation varies among states, one must look to the legislative debates and
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compromises that were struck as part of the process of navigating competing demands in
order to secure passage of charter school legislation in individual states.
States vary widely in their provision of charter schools. Arizona, Florida and
California have the greatest concentration of charter schools, accounting for 42% of all
charter schools in the United States (Abernathy 2007). In seeking to address such
variation in the number of charter schools among states, scholars have studied the impact
of charter school legislation on the creation of new charter schools. Many of Kolderies’
ideal characteristics for the development of charter schools have become incorporated
into criteria that rating agencies and advocacy groups use to assign state grades.
Education policy scholars Finn et. al (2001) drew from these characteristics in order to
develop a categorization of charter school laws as either strong or weak. Strong charter
laws have the following characteristics:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

No restrictions or caps placed on the number of charter schools allowed
Multiple entities are empowered to authorize charter schools
Anyone may submit a charter school application
Freedom from state and local regulations
High degree of legal and operational autonomy
Fiscal equity—charter schools are treated in the same manner with respect to
funding as their traditional school counterparts in that they are guaranteed
equitable funding as compared with their traditional school counterparts
7. Fiscal autonomy
8. Exemption from collective bargaining agreements

Whether state laws allow for an unlimited or a substantial number of schools is a key
consideration because it drives to the heart of the school choice concept. Wong and Shen
observed that the “charter school market is created by the state” (2004, 169). State
legislatures create the rules by which the charter school market operates and a set of
incentives or disincentives for actors. Charter school proponents would argue that an
193
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unfettered market place for education should allow for an unlimited number of charter
schools. Weak charter laws, on the other hand, place tight restrictions on how many
charters may be authorized and/or how many students may be enrolled in them. Twenty
six states including Connecticut have state-imposed caps on charter school enrollment
(Rotherham 2007). Connecticut limits enrollment in each state charter school to 250
students in most schools and 300 for K-8 schools or 25% of district enrollment,
whichever is less. Modifying and lifting the cap has been a key dynamic in the postadoption politics surrounding Connecticut’s charter school law and a perennial item on
the legislative agenda. In 2006, the cap was lifted for charter schools with a
“demonstrated record of achievement” (Conn. Gen. Stat 10-66bb). The school would
have to seek approval from the State Board of Education who is given discretion over
whether a school has a demonstrated record of achievement. Further compounding the
problem as Rotherham notes that “there is no regulatory guidance for the charter school
office as to which criteria it should include in its review” (2007, 83).
The second criterion to assess the relative strength of a charter school law
concerns which entities may authorize charter schools. Chartering authorities essentially
serve as gatekeepers. Strong charter legislation permits multiple entities to grant charters
(Finn, Manno and Vanourek 2001). These include local school boards, state boards of
education, state departments of education and colleges and universities. By enabling
different entities to approve charter schools, barriers to entry are lowered (Hassel 1999).
Teske, Schneider and Cassese noted that:
Local school boards have long enjoyed a monopolistic position in
providing local public schools. We would expect school boards to
discourage competitors who want to reduce their student market share. It
should come as no surprise that the number of different authorizers
194
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allowed by the chartering law is used as a critical parameter in rating the
strength of charter laws. (2005, 131)

The ability of multiple authorizers other than local school boards to approve charter
schools appears to be a key factor in the growth and number of charter schools. The
Center for Education Reform (2003) found that states with multiple authorizers have
nearly eight times more charter schools than states with single sponsors. Buckley and
Kuscova (2003) also found a strong correlation between multiple sponsors and the
proliferation of more charter schools. They attributed this relationship to the fact that
multiple sponsoring authorities avoid the political and procedural obstacles imposed by
one authority.
The viability of a new charter school is dependent upon funding which has been a
source of friction among choice advocates. Fiscal equity or equal treatment of charter
schools in comparison to their traditional public school counterparts has not been
observed uniformly among the states and create what economists refer to as regulatory
barriers that may discourage potential charter school operators from opening new schools.
Charter schools typically receive 78% of the funding that traditional public schools
receive (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools 2010, 10). In the case of
Connecticut, charter schools receive 71% of the state average per pupil expenditure
(Lohman 2010).
Not only is there a substantial differential in funding between charter schools and
traditional public schools, an additional feature of the funding formula is designed to
cushion the impact that charter schools will have on local school districts. Connecticut is
one of only two states that do not require that state and local education funding to follow
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children to charter schools. Moreover, as part of the legislative compromise and to soften
the blow to district schools, when a child leaves a traditional public school in Connecticut
in order to attend a charter school, the state reimburses the local school district for the per
pupil cost (Public Act sec. 10-66ee). As Wahlberg (2007, 33) observed, this practice
“means that public schools are insulated from the consequences of their failure.” Finally,
until the recent education reform was passed by the Connecticut General Assembly,
charter schools authorized by the state board of education were ineligible for a grant of
$500,000 to finance school building projects, building improvements and repayment of
debt (Ziebarth, Celio, Lake and Rainey 2005).
Since the advent of the charter school movement, several advocacy and research
groups have developed rankings based on the aforementioned criteria to assess the
relative strength of charter school laws among the states. These scores have provided the
basis for policy advocacy and for scholarly research. The Center for Education Reform is
the earliest and most cited source of rating information with regard to state charter laws
relied upon by scholars. However, it should be noted that the CER’s framework has been
assailed from various quarters. Wong and Shen’s critique of the CER framework takes
issue with the methodology for its inability “to capture the political compromise at the
center of charter school legislation and the complexity and cross-cutting provisions at the
center of charter law” (2006, 1). Similarly, Scott and Barber (2002) called the CER
framework to task for failing “to capture the intense lobbying and advocacy efforts and
political compromise.” Additionally, Chi and Welner (2008) criticize the framework for
reflecting a free-market bias by only measuring factors relating to the choice and
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competition aspects of a given charter school law instead of equity and other
considerations.
The thrust of most of the critiques leveled by charter school researchers is the
need to develop better criteria for inclusion in a database of charter school rankings upon
which scholars can draw for more reliable results. However, even well-designed cross
national studies still have shortcomings. Composite measures such as the ones used by
the CER are problematic for their aggregation of data. For instance, a state that receives
a “C” may have some provisions which are strong and some which are weak but receive
an overall weak grade which may mask important nuances within a given state.
A proposed solution to the data problem posed by national rankings is to engage
in case studies that analyze component provisions of charter laws with a careful state-by
state analysis to yield a more nuanced understanding (Wong and Shen 2006). One of the
earliest studies to address some of these shortcomings of both cross-national and
quantitative approaches was Bryan Hassel’s (1999) case study of four states with charter
school laws. As Hassel and others points out, political compromise was the key to the
formulation of charter school laws. Further to the point, Ziebarth, Celio, Lake and
Rainey (2005) observed that the root cause of the variation in state laws is traced back to
the legislative process in each state.
Each state’s charter school law is unique, representing the state’s
preferences on everything from the purpose of the law to how charter
schools are to be held accountable and for what. In addition, a state’s
unique mix of history—with education reform, the interplay of state and
local politics, and traditions of school governance—plays a role in
determining who ends up starting schools and what the schools look like.
(Ziebarth et.al. 2005, 18)
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While using the rankings as a point of departure, this research employs the case study
approach by delving deeply into the politics surrounding the passage of charter school
legislation in Connecticut. Informing the debate on charter schools is Connecticut’s
history of education reform policy which serves as a backdrop to legislative deliberations.
Finally, the pivotal role of education interest groups will also be highlighted for their role
in the policy making process.
Ranking Connecticut’s Charter School Law
Notwithstanding the above critique of state charter law rankings, an examination
of the two leading education ranking agencies place Connecticut in the weak category.
The Center for Education Reform assigned Connecticut a grade of “D” for its charter
school law (CER 2011) while The National Alliance for Public Charter Schools ranked
Connecticut 24 out of 40 states. Among the common criteria that both organizations use
to evaluate the relative strength of charter school laws are whether the law provides for
multiple authorizers to approve charter school applications, whether an unlimited number
of schools are allowed, and the extent to which the law provides for autonomy in
operations as well as fiscal equity. Along each of these dimensions, Connecticut’s
charter law can be considered weak. For instance, Connecticut allows only a sole
authorizer for charter schools, the State Board of Education. The state also closely
regulates their enrollment with three different types of capping provisions. Moreover, the
state provides 71% of funding to charter schools and constrains school operations through
hiring practices that are governed by collective bargaining procedures set forth by the
teacher’s union for local charter schools (Public Act 10-111, Connecticut General
Statutes).
198
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In attempting to explain the variation among states in terms of charter school laws,
scholars have generally relied upon the CER rankings. However, limitations in crossnational studies that rely on the CER framework have prompted other avenues of inquiry.
One of the earliest studies to address some of these shortcomings of both cross-national
and quantitative approaches was Bryan Hassel’s (1999) case study of four states with
charter school laws. He provides a useful framework for this study that isolates four key
variables: 1) the partisan balance of the legislature, 2) the role of the governor, 3) the
power of teacher’s organizations, and 4) the objective educational conditions and political
culture. Each one will be explained in the section below. An examination of political
variables, particularly institutional actors, holds the key to understanding why
Connecticut’s charter school law is considered relatively weak.
Partisan Balance of State Legislatures
While charter schools have gained adherents among Democrats and Republicans
alike, the degree of support and level of intensity as expressed in charter school
legislation varies from state to state depending on which party is in control of the state
house. The choice and free market aspects of charter schools appeal to Republicans
while Democrats view them as more acceptable than other market reforms such as
vouchers. Hassel found a strong correlation between partisan control of legislatures and
charter school laws. “Although both parties may support charter legislation of some kind,
Republicans are more likely to favor strong charter laws” (Hassel 1999, 22).
The timing of passage of charter school legislation is also indicative of the
relative strength of charter school laws. States with both houses controlled by the GOP
tended to pass charter school laws at an earlier stage in the movement between 1991 and
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1996. In fact, 66.7% of states with high levels of Republican control, defined as party
control of both houses, were early adopters of strong charter school laws. Conversely,
only 35% of states with low levels of GOP control had done so. In the case of
Connecticut, the legislature has been controlled by Democrats for all but two of the last
thirty years including the time period when charter school legislation was passed by the
Connecticut General Assembly. While these circumstances would not be propitious for
the prospects of charter school legislation in general, a number of other factors came into
play which would alter the fate of charter schools in Connecticut. Connecticut did
eventually pass a charter school law due in large measure to the efforts of Governor
Rowland (1995-2004) in crafting a bipartisan support in the legislature. However, the
content of the charter school law’s provisions was influenced by the involvement of
teachers’ organizations during the legislative process.
Teachers Organizations
The presence and strength of teachers’ organizations in a given state and their
influence over the policy process is also a key variable in determining the content of
charter laws. One of the hallmark features of charter schools is the autonomy of
operations in the personnel area. If one had to distill the charter school governance
structure down to its most essential element, it would undoubtedly be the freedom from
state and district rules regarding the hiring and firing of personnel. Chubb and Moe
(1990) identified school organization rooted in bureaucracy as the main factor hindering
effective schools and student achievement. Their conclusions, drawn from a
comprehensive database of schools, found that features of public school organization
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such as hierarchy, division of labor, specialization, coordination and control are the very
qualities that inhibit the autonomy and professionalism needed for high performance.
Perhaps the most important aspect of charter school autonomy comes with the
ability to hire and fire personnel. The advent of series of civil service laws was
originally designed to protect teachers from political influence. Tenure laws and
certification requirements arose to provide teachers with a degree of insulation from the
vagaries of political administrations and to professionalize teaching. Over the years,
teachers’ organizations have achieved gains on behalf of their membership through
collective bargaining agreements governing teacher pay, certification, retirement, and a
host of other provisions designed to protect the material interests of teachers.
When examining the variation in charter school laws and their content, the
strength of teachers’ unions is an important explanatory variable. Several indices have
been developed to measure the power of teachers’ unions (Mintrom and Vergari 1997).
Measures developed by Mintrom (2000) include contract negotiation, union recognition,
union security, impasse procedures and strike policy, all of which are determined by
collective bargaining procedures, the latter being the most salient for this study. In terms
of overall pro-bargaining environment for teachers, Connecticut ranked seventh highest
among the states (Valletta and Freedman 1985). The salience of Connecticut’s collective
bargaining strength was evident throughout the formulation of the charter school law.
Teachers’ unions played a strong role crafting charter school legislation that protects the
material interests of teachers.
In general, teachers’ unions have tended to oppose charter school laws by
working to defeat them during the early years when charter schools were still in their
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infancy. Once this policy innovation spread throughout the states, teachers’ unions
changed their tactics to support the passage of charter school laws that were favorable to
the material interests of teachers. Both Wong and Shen (2006) and Hassel (1999) found
empirical support for the contention that Democratically-controlled legislatures tended to
produce provisions that weaken charter school legislation. “Emphasizing collective
bargaining and serving at-risk populations is consistent with traditional Democratic party
constituencies concentrated in teacher unions and urban areas with large numbers of atrisk students.” (Wong and Shen 2006). They also found that principles enunciated by
American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association with respect to
charter schools have found their way into many states’ charter laws such as state
certification requirements for charter school teachers, requiring charter school teachers to
join unions and providing them with the same collective bargaining rights as public
school teachers.
The Connecticut Education Association played an instrumental role in shaping the
final charter law. Provisions relating to teachers such as tenure and collective bargaining
laws were inserted into the final language of the charter school legislation. Local charter
schools would be subject to union rules in the form of collective bargaining agreements
while state charter schools would not. (Conn. Gen. Stat. Public Act 10-111, section 4).
Furthermore, in response to Connecticut Education Association’s concern about the
experimental nature of charter schools, the law provides for a two year leave of absence
for teachers to work in a charter school without the loss of seniority or retirement upon
their return to a traditional public school. The latest amendment to the charter school law
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requires all school professionals hired after July 1, 2010 to participate in the state teacher
retirement system (Public Act No 10-111 Sec. 13 section 10-66dd sec D).
Many factors militated against the passage of charter school legislation in
Connecticut, chiefly a Democratically-controlled legislature and powerful teacher unions.
After several failed attempts, charter school legislation passed in 1996. The following
section will trace the political history of legislation in Connecticut and will explain the
policy change in terms of the role of policy entrepreneurs in the executive and legislative
branches. With all the factors militating against charter schools and the previous failed
attempts to secure passage, why did the Connecticut General Assembly pass charter
school legislation in 1996 when the issue had been on the policy agenda since 1991? The
answer lies in several factors that converged in the spring of 1996. A confluence of
certain events made the passage of charter school legislation possible where previous
attempts failed. In contrast to the early 1990s when Governor Weicker’s main priority
was to tackle the severe fiscal crisis hampering the state, John Rowland, a Republican
Governor (1994-2005), placed school choice at the top of his agenda and used his
considerable political skills to gain bipartisan support in the Connecticut state legislature.
Early Attempts to Pass Charter School Legislation
The passage of charter school legislation by the Connecticut General Assembly in
1996 was the culmination of a process that began as early as 1991 and included two
failed attempts to move charter schools onto the legislative agenda. These early attempts
failed due to several factors. First, the lack of overall familiarity with the charter school
concept on the part of the general public and legislators was a considerable hurdle in
achieving support and passage. This was due in large part to the timing of the initial
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attempt which took place in 1991-1992. At this juncture only a few states had passed
charter legislation and the lack of data or evidence relating to the performance of charter
schools at this phase served to cast doubt in the minds of legislators. Moreover,
opponents portrayed charter schools as something other than public in framing the debate.
In testimony offered by interest groups in Connecticut detailed in the next section, many
attempted to cast charter schools as something other than public schools and
characterized funding for charter schools as the diversion of public funds. Finally, the
lack of a champion in the form of a governor or advocacy groups also hampered the
ability of the issue to gain traction among legislators.
The first attempt began in 1992 with the Connecticut Task Force on Charter
Schools. During the 1991 session of the General Assembly “An Act Concerning
Innovative Programs” (Conn. Gen. Stat. Public Act 91-285) authorized the legislature to
empanel a task force to study and make recommendations regarding charter schools.
Task Force Chairman Stephen Tracy had been an early proponent of charter schools in
Connecticut. As a twenty five year veteran of public schools as a teacher and later as
Superintendent of Schools in New Milford, Tracy reached the conclusion that choice was
the only solution to the problems outlined in A Nation at Risk (NCCE 1983). In outlining
his views in a white paper issued upon the task force’s conclusion in 1992, he wrote the
following:
Among the various approaches to choice, the notion of charter schools is
particularly attractive because it blends the power of choice and competition with
a commitment to equal opportunity and teacher empowerment. As proposed by
Connecticut’s Task Force on Charter Schools, charter schools would operate
under charters granted by the state board of education. They would be committed
to quality student outcomes, staffed and controlled by certified teachers, publicly
funded, and open to all students (Tracy 1992, 2).
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The task force presented its report and made recommendations to the state
legislature. The report called for the establishment of six pilot charter schools to operate
under a charter granted by the State Board of Education to open in the fall of 1994. The
plan was derailed and as later recounted by the task force chairman Stephen Tracy, never
made its way onto the legislative agenda for a vote either in 1992 or 1993. In reflecting
upon the fate of the charter school proposal, Tracy recalled how the Commission
strategically included both major teachers associations. He noted however, that “the
association leaders ‘watered down’ the proposal during the course of the year’s planning
and then offered the only opposition when the commission voted to send the bill to the
legislature” (Reigeluth and Garfinkel 1994, 91). The bill, which was never reported out
of committee, would have established six pilot charter schools.
Among the more controversial recommendations in the report was the provision
to allow funds to follow the student. The report touted this provision as “charter schools
at no new cost to the taxpayer” wherein the charter school would receive payment from
the school district in which the student resides “equal to 90% of the district’s net current
expenditure per pupil” (Report of the Task Force 1992, vii). In further describing the
benefits of this funding arrangement, the report stated that due to the fact that districts
would lose dollars for students that attend charter schools, they “would have an incentive
to improve the quality of their programs” (Report of the Task Force 1992, 14). This
provision has been a non-starter in subsequent charter school debates and a point of
contention with charter school advocates. The plan also called for collective bargaining
laws to apply to public school teachers who taught in local charter schools.
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During the intervening years from 1992-1996, additional task forces and
commissions would make recommendations regarding school choice. However, Tracy’s
departure left a void in charter school advocacy and conditions would not be ripe for
charter school legislation until 1996 after a protracted battle that culminated in the
passage of Connecticut’s first charter law.
Governor John Rowland (1994-2005) and Policy Entrepreneurship
Upon Governor Rowland’s taking office in 1994, a charter school law still
appeared unlikely to pass the legislature. However, his leadership was a key factor in
propelling a stalled policy agenda forward. In asserting the important role that governors
play in education policy, scholarship on state government has cast them as key political
actors in terms of their power, visibility and influence over the legislative process
(Bernick and Wiggins 1991, Rosenthal 1990, Morehouse 1998). The impetus for charter
school policy has often been due to governors making a concerted effort to champion
them as part of an overall education policy reform agenda.
Mintrom’s (2000) discussion of policy entrepreneurship and school choice is
instructive to this analysis. In his seminal work on policy entrepreneurs and school
choice, he defined a policy entrepreneur as the efforts of a group of political actors who,
“driven by a range of motives, have been instrumental in articulating the school choice
idea and getting it onto state legislative agendas” (2000, 2). In the case of Connecticut,
Governor Rowland spearheaded a number of initiatives in the education arena. In a June
21, 2004 Associated Press article titled “Embattled Governor Resigns,” John Rowland
was lauded as a “rising star” in the Republican Party who enjoyed a high profile on the
national political scene. His policy initiatives drew attention from President Bush who
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heralded him as the “future of the Republican Party.” As a young conservative and the
youngest governor in Connecticut state history at the age of 37, Rowland embraced an
education reform agenda that heavily emphasized choice including charter schools and
vouchers. While Rowland ultimately resigned from office due to a corruption scandal,
he was nonetheless instrumental in bringing about a series of education reforms.
A June 6, 1995 Hartford Courant article by Stephen Olemacher, “School Choice
Issue Put Off to Next Session,” reported that due to Rowland’s disappointment over the
failure of the legislature to take action on school choice, he signed Executive Order
Number 8 establishing a Blue Ribbon Commission on School Choice. The commission
was charged with making recommendations on programs that would increase parental
involvement in the education of their children and would expand educational
opportunities for children and families especially for the economically disadvantaged.
The Commission made several recommendations that ultimately were included in House
Bill 5698 An Act Concerning the Recommendations of the Governor’s Commission on
School Choice. Included in the bill were proposals regarding vouchers and charter
schools. Vouchers were a revival of a demonstration project that began back in the 1970s
under the name “Project Choice.” As a policy initiative, they were Rowland’s main
priority. In a number of forums, Rowland used his bully pulpit to discuss school choice
in an effort to revive the defunct program which languished due to lack of funding and a
sunset provision. Placing them back on the table was part and parcel of Governor
Rowland’s choice agenda and congruent with his conservative political ideology. Over
the course of his first two administrations, Rowland exerted considerable energy in
moving school choice onto the policy agenda. Vouchers figured prominently in his first
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administration. When it became apparent that the teachers’ unions would not be
supportive, Rowland backed away from his earlier proposals. In a August 28, 1998,
Hartford Courant article by Mark Pazniokas “Rowland to Union: No School Vouchers,”
the article noted that Rowland backed off of his original position as he faced Democratic
challenger Barbara Kennelly during his first reelection campaign who enjoyed the
support of teachers’ unions.
While ultimately not prevailing in the voucher battle, it was an important tactical
maneuver on Rowland’s part to gain inroads into school choice and to pave the way for
the acceptance of charter schools. Moreover, by inclusion of vouchers, considered to be a
more radical reform, Rowland’s tactic would appear to be congruent with the carrot and
stick narrative offered in Hassel’s case study. He noted that whether a given educational
reform is considered solo or in tandem with other policy reforms greatly affects its
prospects for legislative approval. “The presence of charter schools on a crowded agenda
may have made charter schools less threatening than if they were considered alone”
(Hassel 1999, 66). Hassel attributes this to the fact that educational interest groups would
only be able to devote full attention to the more threatening aspects of school choice such
as vouchers. This appears to be the case in Connecticut. In 1996, charter school
legislation was considered as part of a larger package of reforms including vouchers.
After lengthy public hearings, most of which was devoted to the voucher provision, the
Senate passed SB 59 which gave birth to charter schools in Connecticut. Vouchers fell
by the way side during the legislative deliberations after numerous interest groups were
vociferous in their opposition.
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A second opportunity emerged for Rowland to exercise gubernatorial leadership
on school choice when the State Supreme Court ruled in Sheff v. O’Neill (1996) 238,
Conn. 1, 678 A 2d. 1267 that Hartford’s schools were racially, ethnically and
economically isolated. Equal educational opportunity would emerge again as a recurring
theme in Connecticut’s education reform debate. In contrast to the 1970s where school
finance was the primary vehicle to remedy the inequities across school districts, Rowland
converted the education agenda to press for greater choice for parents and students in the
wake of the landmark Sheff decision. In response to the court’s decision, Rowland issued
Executive Order No. 10 to create the Educational Improvement Panel to “explore,
identify and report on a broad range of policy options for reducing racial isolation in our
state’s public schools, improving teaching and learning, enhancing a sense of community
and encouraging parental involvement” (Sheff v O’Neill). Rowland seized this
opportunity to advance an education reform agenda that would use choice as a vehicle to
accomplish the goal of reducing racial isolation. Included in the EIP’s final report were a
number of recommendations such as an expansion of public school choice (Memorandum
of Decision, March 3, 1998). The legislature passed “An Act Enhancing Educational
Choices and Opportunities” to reduce racial, ethnic and economic isolation.
As reported by Rick Green in the Hartford Courant article of July 27, 1998,
entitled “School Choice Common Ground,” the intersection of the Sheff decision and
Rowland’s reform agenda made possible the advancement of a mutually shared agenda.
While Rowland was interested primarily in the notion of choice, the Sheff decision
provided an opportunity to advance his stalled agenda. The propitious timing of events
was commented upon by then State Education Commissioner Ted Sergi (1996) in a New
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York Times October 20, 1996 article by Fred Musante entitled “Wings on a Bird, School
Reform and Diversity” (October 20, 1996) that: “There is a different will for political
change and we have Supreme Court decision. The 1996 charter law was amended in the
1997 with changes made in response to the Sheff decision. Charter school applicants
were required to describe how their proposed charter school would reduce racial isolation
among students by promoting a diverse student body and to demonstrate in their
admissions criteria how they would promote racial and ethnic diversity among their staff.
A Prelude to Charter Schools in Connecticut: Horton and Sheff
Charter schools tend to emerge in the context of a broader dialogue concerning
education reform within a given state over the course of many years. The larger
legislative context of the policy debate is undoubtedly an important factor shaping the
prospects for charter school legislation. The larger issues affecting education in
Connecticut and that serve as a backdrop to the charter school debate included funding
inequities across school districts, declining performance, a yawning achievement gap,
and racial isolation of urban schools. Charter schools have been the most recent attempt
to address the shortcomings of Connecticut’s public schools. Over the course of thirty
years, the terms of debate shifted from school finance reform to racial isolation to more
recent discussions about the so-called achievement gap. The discussion reached a
crescendo when the Hartford Courant reported on August 30, 2010 that Connecticut had
the largest achievement gap in the nation. Narrowing the gap between minority and
white students would become a focal point for reformers.
During the 1970s, school finance dominated the education reform agenda. The
primary thrust was to correct for funding disparities between school districts and to afford
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students an equal educational opportunity despite where they lived. A wave of state court
decisions drove changes in how states funded public schools, and in most cases required
states to increase the state’s share of education funds. In Connecticut, the legislature’s
agenda was driven by the Horton court decisions which directed the legislative body to
devise a more equitable funding formula that resulted in the legislature devising a cost
sharing arrangement between the state and school districts known as the ECS or
Educational Cost Sharing grant (DeNardis 2010). Efforts to further equalize the funding
formula continued until the late 1980s through the 1990s when the reform agenda took
another approach which focused on the issue of racial isolation as it impacted equal
educational opportunity through the Sheff decisions. The dominant approach today,
while retaining elements of earlier reform periods, framed the education policy debate
primarily in terms of choice, government management, and accountability.
Connecticut’s First Charter School Legislation: “A Convergence of Interests, A
Convenient Marriage of Individuals with Different Agendas”
After several failed attempts, school choice proposals were finally given a full
hearing on March 11, 1996, by the Connecticut General Assembly. The package of
reforms included several proposals including vouchers and charter schools which were to
be voted on in tandem. The consideration of charter schools alongside the more
controversial proposal for vouchers proved to be a decisive and strategic move on the part
of the Governor and the bill’s sponsors. In comparison to vouchers, charter schools were
perceived to be as less threatening among the educational interest groups, particularly
teachers’ unions.
Among the interest groups who gave testimony on Senate Bill 59 were the usual
constellation of educational and industry organizations, some of whom had served on the
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Governor’s Commission on School Choice. These included the Connecticut Association
of Independent Schools (CAIS), the Office of Policy and Management (OPM), the
Connecticut Business and Industry Association (CBIA), the Connecticut Association of
Boards of Education (CABE) , the Citizens Alliance for Public Education CAPE, League
of Women Voters, and the Connecticut Education Association (CEA), to name the most
prominent groups.
Testifying in favor of charter schools were CAIS, CBIA, and OPM. Peter Tacy,
Executive Director of CAIS and a member of the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission
on School Choice, started off the public hearings. Referring to the previous attempt at
reform, Tacy spoke of the urgency and the timing of the proposal as well as referencing
past efforts by opponents to derail the legislation.
You’ve heard much about the evils of these proposals. I believe the worst that
can be said about them is that, seen all together, they are so much less than the
real, unmet need. It is time for this Legislature to face that need. Our children
deserve better. If choice legislation must be the first item on our state’s reform
agenda, the bills before you propose little in that line that is unreasonable. They
may even bring progress. But whatever you do about them, a crying need will
remain. It’s time to meet it (Report of the Task Force 1992, 854).

Also speaking in favor of school choice and charter schools was CBIA, the Connecticut
Business and Industry Association a pro-business interest group whose testimony
revolved around the concern for boosting student achievement in order for Connecticut’s
young people to compete in a global marketplace (Education Committee Hearing 1996,
967). The Connecticut Association of Boards of Education (CABE) also spoke in favor
of charter schools provided that the schools are non-sectarian, have non-discriminatory
enrollment policies, enjoy the support of parents and teachers, and empower local boards
of education to grant charters (Education Committee Hearing 1996, 873).
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The Connecticut Education Association provided mixed testimony reflecting the
union’s ambivalence about charter schools. The testimony reveals the contours of the
final legislation which is replete with provisions designed to address the union’s concerns
about the material interests of teachers. CEA President Eagan’s comments presaged the
bill’s final outcome and indicated a willingness of the union to support the bill. His
testimony was laden with several caveats that reveal some of the compromises that would
emerge in the final legislation. Eagan stated that the CEA’s support would be contingent
on a number of elements and offered the following:
A good charter school law should not be a means of dismantling public education,
should not be used to make money from children, and should not be a means of
subsidizing religious and other private schools with taxpayer dollars. A good
charter school law should promise the use of innovative instructional strategies
that improve teaching and learning and should not simply focus on
decentralization and deregulation (Education Committee Hearing 1996, 945).
Figuring prominently among CEA’s concerns was the impact that charter school laws
would have upon teachers. Accordingly, they believed that a good charter school law
should assure that only certified teachers and administrators work with students. In
referring to charter schools as experiments, CEA stance was that teachers should not have
to give up their protections in order to participate. President Eagan made reference to a
similar effort underway in New Jersey which involved a joint collaboration with teachers’
unions working closely with Governor Whitman to craft support for charter school
legislation (Education Committee Hearing 1996, 145). He also alluded to the fact that the
CEA could support the bill if modifications were made and concluded his testimony by
stating that CEA had passed a resolution calling for the investigation of charter schools in
Connecticut.
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Ultimately, the CEA backed the charter school legislation and was pivotal in
securing passage in the Democratically-controlled legislature. In reflecting upon the role
of teachers’ unions, Yvette Melendez-Thiesfield, the Charter School Program Manager,
provided testament to their key role when she remarked “The reason the bill passed in the
last session was that there was a lot of consensus building with the local teachers’ union.”
(Johnston 1996).
Charter school legislation was passed in a final vote on Senate Bill 59 with 28 in
favor and 7 senators against the measure (Senate Proceedings 1996, 3473). Two
legislators were instrumental in the passage of charter school legislation, Senator Judith
Freedman, a Republican, and Senator Kevin Sullivan, a Democrat. Together, they
shepherded the legislation through the Connecticut General Assembly. Freedman was a
formal school teacher who strongly favored charter schools. Sullivan had a long standing
interest in education policy dating back to the late 1970s when he served as executive
assistant to the Commissioner of Education and was instrumental in devising the first
equalization funding formula for state aid to school districts (Tracy 1984). He had also
served on the 1992 Connecticut Task Force on Charter Schools when the first effort was
underway to advance charter schools. Both were ranking members of the Education
Committee in the state senate, had strong standing among their senate colleagues and
were instrumental in crafting bipartisan support.
Since charter school legislation was first passed in 1996, Connecticut has created
twenty two charter schools, enrolling 4,992 students, and accounting for 1.6% of all
public schools (CER 2011). These schools are located primarily in five schools districts:
New Haven, Bridgeport, Norwalk, Stamford and Hartford. By statute, charter schools

214

Volume V, Number 2
must serve at-risk populations that are subject to racial and economic isolation. Similar
to their counterparts in other states, the charter school population is comprised of a larger
minority population (63%) than traditional public schools.
Capping and Compromise
During the intervening years from passage of the first charter school law in 1996
until 2010 when the legislature passed the Education Reform Act, the battle over charter
schools has largely centered on the issues of enrollment caps and achieving more
equitable funding. The most conspicuous feature of Connecticut’s charter school
legislation is the limit placed on the number of charter school students. A cap is a limit
placed on the number of charter schools authorized by the state or on student enrollment.
As Terry (2009, 2) notes, caps are “artificial limits on charter growth with no connection
to charter school quality or growing student or parental demand.” Connecticut is among
twenty six states that have capping provisions. The enrollment caps limit the number of
students at each school. Over the course of several years since the initial law was passed
in 1996, the legislature voted to raise the cap to 250 students or 25% of the district; 300
students or 25% of the district for K8 schools and 85 students per grade for charters with
demonstrated record of achievement (National Alliance 2010, 28). From a limit of 1,000
students statewide, the cap was raised to 1,500 for the 1998-1999 school year. Finally,
with the passage of the Education Reform of 2010, the legislature lifted the cap on highperforming charter schools provided that they apply for a waiver with the State
Department of Education.
Over the last fourteen years, the legislature has occasionally lifted the cap on
enrollment in existing charter schools in response to interest group pressure. The gradual
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easing and lifting of enrollment caps has occurred as part of the political bargaining
process. As Ziebarth (2006) notes, most state charter laws had original capping
provisions that were the result of a political tradeoff between charter school proponents
and the teachers’ union. Caps became a pivotal issue and a key bargaining chip when the
Obama administration made lifting charter school caps part of the criteria to qualify for
the Race to the Top funds. In fact, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan issued a warning
regarding the practice of capping in terms of affecting a state’s charter school application.
In a preface to his speech on the topic of school turnarounds, the Secretary told states that
they must be open to charter schools.
States that do not have public charter laws or put artificial caps on the growth of
charter schools will jeopardize their applications under the Race to the Top Fund.
To be clear, the administration is not looking to open unregulated and
unaccountable schools. We want real autonomy for charters, combined with a
rigorous authorization process and higher performance standards (U.S.
Department of Education 2009).
In preparation for Connecticut’s application to Race to the Top and to make the
application more competitive, the General Assembly passed The Education Reform Act
of 2010 which included a provision to lift the cap on high-performing charter schools.
Connecticut, along with several other states, responded to federal incentives to reform by
aligning state education policies to position themselves for RTTP funds.

Charter School Redux: The Education Reform Act of 2010
The Education Committee held public hearings on March 15, 2010. Amidst an
overflow crowd that spilled into the corridors of the Legislative Office Building,
supporters and opponents lined up to give their input on the education reform package.
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Many of the familiar interest groups gave testimony on various pieces of the legislative
package. Additionally, there other interest groups that had emerged since 1996 such as
the Connecticut Coalition for Achievement Now (ConnCAN) and the Connecticut
Coalition for Justice in Education Funding (CCJEF). ConnCAN was a new arrival on the
scene in terms of education interest groups. It was largely due to ConnCAN’s advocacy
that modest changes in Connecticut’s charter school law were effectuated during the 2010
session of the General Assembly. In some cases, their positions intersected, in others
they diverged and were at odds with one another usually around funding issues. For
instance, CCJEF opposed charter schools for diverting resources away from traditional
public schools which would undoubtedly affect funding formulas as allocated by the
Education Cost Sharing grant administered by the state. On the other hand, ConnCAN
was a staunch advocate of the policy that school funds should follow the child. While
ConnCAN did not prevail on the financial issue, it did prod the legislature to lift the cap
on high performing charter schools.
On April 30, 2010, a final debate was held on Senate Bill 438. The two key
legislators involved in crafting the legislation were Senators Gaffey and Fleishman. As
ranking members of the Education Committee, they were responsible for holding
meetings with the various interest groups in order to craft the legislation that would be
aligned with the federal application criteria that ultimately were submitted as part of
Connecticut’s Race to the Top application. Having lost out on round one, Senator Gaffey
noted the effort that was undertaken to position Connecticut to be more competitive in
round two of Race to the Top.
When the news came out that we were not in the final sixteen states in round 1, I
was quite upset by that. And that day I got on the phone and I called
217

New England Journal of Political Science
Commissioner Mark McQuillen, and I told him that I’d like to convene a group of
stakeholders including himself and his staff, to sit down and grind out what we
needed to do as a General Assembly, as the State of Connecticut, to change our
laws so that we were better suited to win round 2 (Final Senate Debate 2010,
2080).

Germane to the charter school discussion, the legislative proposals included a waiver for
state charter schools that demonstrate a record of high student achievement. It also
allowed the State Board of Education to issue charters without taking into account
available appropriations, and finally, the legislation made the charter school facility grant
program permanent. Rising in support of the education reform package, Senator Meyer
offered the following comments which capture the change in mood between the passage
of the first charter school law in 1996 and the Education Reform Act of 2010. Noting
that the tide had changed with respect to public opinion and charter schools he offered the
following testimony:
For the last ten years there have been some lone voices calling for a major
increase in the charter schools, independent schools, and what bill calls the
“innovation schools.” That the sun has really set on that new movement and
recognition that education for our children, for our grandchildren is something
greater than the way we’ve done it in the past. I had lunch today with Marian
Wright Edelman, the Director of the Children’s Fund in Washington, DC and
actually a Representative in the District of Columbia in the U.S. Congress. And
we had a chance to talk about the charter school movement, which she, like me,
ten years ago would have strongly opposed. She said two things at lunch today
about charter schools. She said, “First, remember charter schools are public
schools.” And the second thing she said is that “Charter schools are an important
part of the answer.” When we look at a great charter school in New Haven like
the Amistad School, we know she’s right. And I just urge enthusiastic support of
this bill. It’s going into the future in the best direction for our state and our
country (Final Senate Debate 2010, 2103).

It was heralded as the most important reform since the passage of the charter school law
in 1996. Governor Rell (2004-2010) signed the bill that included lifting the enrollment
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on high performing charter schools. As reported by Jacqueline Rabe and Robert Frahm
in the May 26, 2010 Connecticut Mirror article entitled “Hoping for Federal Aid, Rell
signs sweeping education reform bill,” the resulting education reform package came
about in large part due to the powerful financial incentives of federal funds coupled with
strong legislative leadership in ultimately pushing through the legislation.
An unlikely coalition crafted the bill, including the state’s two major teachers’
unions, the superintendents’ association, administrators’ association and the
school reform group ConnCAN. ConnCAN’s advocacy was at odds with teacher
unions, and the group was also strongly critical of the initial Race to the Top
application prepared by McQuillan.
While Senator Gaffey’s working group did not typically agree on many issues, the
prospect of being awarded 195 million dollars provided a powerful incentive for
cooperation. The federal application included several components with accompanying
points awarded to each: linking teacher evaluations with student performance, additional
graduation requirements, the establishment of governance councils for low performing
schools and easing restrictions on charter schools (Federal Register, July 29, 2009). The
state legislature attempted to mirror the required components of the application in the
package of legislative reforms.1 However, as noted in the aftermath of losing the Race to
the Top, most of the reforms fell short and did not go far enough particularly with respect
to teacher pay and performance which still lacked specifics. The charter school
component of the application was worth 40 points out of a possible 400. The
legislature’s move to lift the cap on high performing charter schools garnered 29 out 40
1

The education reform package consisted of several individual pieces of legislation: SB438 An Act
Concerning Charter Schools and Open Choice Program Funding, SB440 An Act Concerning Schools
Districts and Teacher Performance, SB442 An Act Concerning Boards of Education, HB5487 An Act
Concerning the Open Choice Program, HB 5489 An Act Concerning Secondary School Reform, HB 5491
an Act Concerning Certain School District Reforms to Reduce the Achievement Gap in Connecticut, and
HB5493 An Act Concerning Strategic Planning in State Education Policy and Charter School Funding
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points. However, the cap limiting the overall number of charter schools to this date has
not been lifted.

In feedback provided by the federal Department of Education,

Connecticut’s application was deemed to be weak on a number of grounds including
charter schools which was a contributing factor to losing the federal grant competition in
both phases (Sam Dillon 2010).
Conclusion
With all the factors militating against charter schools and previous failed attempts
to secure passage, this paper attempts to explain why the Connecticut General Assembly
passed charter school legislation in 1996 when the issue had been debated since 1992.
The answer lies in several factors that converged in the spring of 1996. Consistent with
the pattern in other states, charter school laws emerged where the GOP consistently
controlled the Governor’s office and where unions were strong. While seemingly
contradictory, teachers’ organization sought to guide and craft legislation that would
reflect the material interests of teachers. The resulting combination of GOP control of
the Governorship counterbalanced by a Democratically-controlled legislature influenced
by strong unions produced weak charter school legislation.
The Race to the Top also shaped the policy environment. President Obama’s
signature education initiative rewarded states for demonstrating innovation in teacher
certification and evaluation. The RTTP funds also included a provision concerning
charter schools. States had to demonstrate in their policies that they were supportive of
charter schools in terms of lifting the caps in order to facilitate their formation.
Additionally, the arrival of on the scene of new advocacy groups on behalf of charter
schools such as ConnCAN served to highlight awareness of charter schools and pressure
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the state legislature for more equitable treatment of charter schools. ConnCAN’s critique
of the state’s charter school law and prediction that it would lose out on federal funds if it
did not lift the cap was one of the driving forces behind the legislature’s adoption of
reforms to better position Connecticut’s grant application. The catalyst of federal
funding in a competitive grant program where Connecticut stood to gain millions in funds
finally broke the stalemate that had typically characterized policies towards charter
schools.
While education policy in Connecticut tends towards the status quo, this inertia
has been periodically interrupted when external forces break the logjam. At both critical
junctures in 1996 and 2010, external forces served as the catalyst for policy reforms. The
first critical juncture took place with the arrival on the scene of a new political actor and
policy innovator in the person of Governor John Rowland (1995-2004). His
championing of a school choice agenda also coincided with the Sheff court decision
which propelled forward a stalled policy agenda. Charter schools became one
mechanism to achieve the goal of reducing racial isolation. In this context, charter
schools were the product of a conservative Republican Governor and Democratic
majority in the legislature with competing goals and objectives. For the Governor,
charter schools fit a pro-school choice agenda while for his democratic counterparts it
was a means of satisfying the court ordered desegregation of Sheff v. O’Neill.
Charter schools, while comprising only a small fraction of the total number of
schools in Connecticut represent an important alternative in terms of educational
opportunities available to school children. As testament to their growing popularity,
charter schools have over 5,000 students on waiting lists (Connecticut State Department
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of Education, 2010). Despite the growing demand, charter schools in Connecticut
continue to face considerable obstacles in the form of political opposition from teachers’
unions and other quarters that has impeded their growth and expansion. Recent history
has demonstrated that the policy stalemate prevailing in Connecticut education policy can
be overcome when outside forces serve as a catalyst for reform such as seen in the Race
to the Top program. It appears that given the inertia in state policy making, the future of
charter schools may hinge on federal intervention again through the reauthorization of the
Elementary and Secondary Act or ESEA. Charter schools have received federal
recognition for their importance in providing greater educational opportunities in the
educational arena. The policy emphasis of charter schools particularly at the federal level
will be an important factor in determining the future of charter schools in Connecticut.
The reauthorization of ESEA currently pending in Congress envisions a continued federal
role in charter schools through a permanent competitive federal grant program designed
to foster the creation of new schools. The recognition of the importance of charter
schools and cognizance of the policy logjam at the state level will ensure a continued
federal presence in charter schools for the foreseeable future.
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